We don’t disagree that much. We just can’t stand each other.

A new report from Digital Public Square and Abacus Data surveyed 2,250 Canadians on the state of polarization — and the findings challenge some assumptions.

Two-thirds of Canadians place themselves in the political centre, which sounds like a moderate country. But when asked how they feel about people on the other side, the picture shifts dramatically. The gap between what Canadians believe and how they feel about each other is the subject of this conversation with the report's two authors. We dig into why the political left is better at disliking the right than vice versa, why younger Canadians are more open to leaders who bend the rules, and what — if anything — can actually be done about affective polarization before it gets worse.

Key Takeaways

• There's a critical difference between ideological polarization (disagreeing on policy) and affective polarization (disliking people on the other side). Canada's problem is primarily affective — Canadians aren't that far apart on the spectrum, but they've developed strong negative feelings toward the other side.
• Two-thirds of Canadians self-identify in the three centrist positions on a seven-point scale. Only about 12% place themselves on the far left or far right. But even a single step left or right of centre triggers strong in-group/out-group feelings.
• The hostility is asymmetrical. Canadians who are slightly left of centre view the right more negatively than slightly right-of-centre Canadians view the left. Richard Jenkins attributes this partly to the left feeling it holds the moral high ground on social issues — and viewing the right as threatening hard-fought wins.
• People on the far right are more likely to believe their views represent the majority. When election results don't reflect that — as in 2019 and 2021 when Conservatives won the popular vote but not the most seats — it feeds a sense of injustice and conspiratorial thinking about the political system.
• Canadians overwhelmingly blame politicians and political parties for polarization. But the left and right diverge on secondary causes: the left points to social media and influencers, the right points to the political system and Canada's diverse makeup.
• A nuance worth noting: those same younger Canadians were also the most supportive of protecting minority group rights, suggesting their frustration is with the system's performance rather than its values.
• Digital Public Square has been testing interventions that correct misperceptions — showing Canadians that people on the other side aren't as different as they assume. Early experimental evidence suggests this builds empathy and a sense of shared concern.

00:00 Joseph's note on the Iran/Middle East developments over the weekend
00:33 Introduction: Setting the stage on polarization in Canada and the UK
02:14 What is affective polarization and why does it matter more than ideological polarization?
04:11 Where Canadians actually place themselves on the political spectrum — and the caveats
05:42 Andrew on the shifting definition of "the middle" and how social sorting distorts it
06:47 Richard on how Canadians overestimate the number of people at the extremes
08:13 How political identity now extends beyond politics into culture, sports, and media
11:15 The mobilization problem: why first-past-the-post incentivizes playing to the edges
12:28 Who Canadians blame for polarization — and how the left and right differ
13:40 The asymmetry: why the left is better at disliking the right than vice versa
16:24 The far right's majority perception problem — and what happens when election results don't match
19:55 Pseudo-environments, algorithmic validation, and Walter Lippmann in the social media age
21:12 The six segments: Frustrated Pessimists, Civic Optimists, Engaged Mainstream, and more
24:44 Why the Civic Optimists skew older — and what that means for the future
27:20 Young Canadians, strong leaders, and the appetite for rule-bending
29:25 The nuance: younger Canadians still strongly support minority rights
30:10 What actually works: Digital Public Square's interventions and experimental evidence
35:07 The attention economy problem: contrast messaging and the 10-second engagement window
36:19 Electoral reform as a structural response — and Andrew's pushback from European examples
43:51 The simplest solution: put the phone down and go to the pub
46:11 Closing remarks and where to find the full report